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Abstract 
This article examines whether Ethiopia’s Trade Competition and Consumer 
Protection Proclamation enacted in 2014 can deliver its pledges toward 
ensuring fair trade practices. Trade competition envisages viable competitors in 
the context equal opportunities in operation and access to factors of production 
of goods and services. It is under such setting that the production and 
distribution of goods and services can match the level of consumer demand and 
choice (in kind, quantity, quality and price) envisaged in the law. On the 
contrary, private economic actors cannot be protected from unfair business 
practices in the context of pressures from non-private sector economic 
hegemony and politically affiliated oligopolistic entities. It is argued that a 
broad-based private sector and its enablement including the need to address 
gaps in Ethiopia’s land laws, an enhanced autonomy of the Trade Competition 
and Consumer Protection Authority (TCCPA) in the context of good 
governance (which includes rule of law and independent judiciary), 
representation of stakeholders in the Authority, and the empowerment of civil 
society organizations are crucial to deliver the pledges embodied in Ethiopia’s 
competition law.   
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Introduction 
There have been specific laws on trade practices in Ethiopia since the Trade 
Practices Decree of 19631 and the Trade Practices Proclamation of 19652 which 
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1 Trade Practices Decree No 50/1963. 
2 Trade Practices Proclamation No. 228/1965. 
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regulated trade competition with some peripheral reference to consumer 
protection. After the hibernation of these laws due to a centrally planned 
economy influenced by Marxist policies from 1975 to 1991, a proclamation was 
enacted in 20033 to regulate trade practices, followed by another proclamation 
on trade competition and consumer protection in 2010.4 The current Trade 
Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No. 813/20135 (which was 
enacted in March 2014),6 substitutes the earlier proclamations. These specific 
laws substantiate the provisions in the Civil Code of 1960 and the Commercial 
Code of 1960, special legislation on mandatory safety standards, Ethiopia’s 
criminal law and other laws that embody provisions relevant to trade 
competition and consumer protection.  
The unified approach of Proclamation No. 813/2013 (TCCPP) has enabled it 
to regulate trade competition and consumer protection.  This article focuses on 
trade competition and examines whether the Proclamation effectively delivers its 
pledges toward ensuring fair trade practices. Section 1 addresses the nexus 
between trade competition and consumer welfare. Section 2 states the 
prohibitions (that are embodied in the Trade Competition and Consumer 
Protection Proclamation) against anti-competitive (restrictive) business practices. 
Administrative enforcement of trade practices and the gaps thereof are 
highlighted in Section 3.   
  Section 4 presents an overview of comparative experience in state 
intervention toward private sector empowerment in contrast to predatory state 
interventions that adversely affect economic performance. Sections 5 to 8 
examine the impediments against and the way forward in the implementation of 
the pledges toward fair trade practices that are embodied in the Trade 
Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation. Even though the 
competition regime under Proclamation No. 813/2013 is fairly specific and 
detailed, these sections discuss the challenges in fair competition under settings 
of excessive non-private sector hegemony, oligopolistic vested interest and 
problems in land tenure security. The discussion in these sections thus shows the 
need for the empowerment and enablement of the private sector.  
 
 
                                           
3 Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003. 
4 The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No. 685/2010. 
5 The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No. 813/2013.  
6 The English version of the Proclamation is unduly designated as Proclamation No. 
813/2013 (due to an apparently typographical error in printing on the Proclamation), while 
it should have been referred to as Proclamation No. 813/2014 because it was enacted on 
March 21, 2014 (Megabit 12, 2006 Ethiopian Calendar).  
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1.  The Trade Competition and Consumer Welfare Nexus 
Laws on trade competition envisage certain core elements of a market economy, 
i.e., “a market equipped with mechanisms allowing competition between 
businesses, and the resulting strive for technological progress”,7 market share, 
productivity and competitiveness. In centrally planned economies, where the 
means of production are state-owned, the economic position of public 
enterprises is “institutionalized by the socialist economic order itself” and the 
protection of competition “did not make sense”.8  
In Hungary, for instance, “competition law fell into a state of hibernation 
between 1948 and the 1960s” because “the earlier competition acts were not 
officially abolished” under the socialist government “but in practice they were 
regarded as ineffective”.9 Citing Kornai,10 Ceres states that the shortage 
economy that existed in Hungary during the period, “created a safe market for 
the seller and the producer”, and they were as a result “neither interested in nor 
motivated by quality investment, product innovation, or delivery times”.11  
An economic system need not necessarily be socialist or centrally planned 
for competition law to be dormant because other factors, as well, affect the level 
of application of competition law. Based on South Korea’s experience, Choi 
states that until 1980, “most competition laws appear[ed] to be dormant” owing 
to “the absence of a competition law culture and inexperience with 
enforcement”.12 Moreover, Choi notes that “competition policy will tend to lose 
out in cases of serious conflict with other policy objectives, such as when the 
government intervenes in private activities” thereby impeding “the development 
of competition law enforcement” and making it “difficult to establish a 
competition law culture”.13   
South Korea’s competition law regime, “used to be similar to that of other 
developing countries before its comprehensive competition law, the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA), was first introduced in 1980”.14 Even 
                                           
7 Magdalena Tulibacka (2009), Product Liability Law in Transition: A Central European 
Perspective, Ashgate, p. 4. 
8 Katalin Cseres (2004), “The Hungarian Cocktail of Competition Law and Consumer 
Protection: Should It Be Dissolved?”  Journal of Consumer Policy, 27: p. 46. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Kornai, J. (2000). The Hungarian reform process: Visions, hopes and reality. In: J. Kornai, 
Evolution of the Hungarian economy 1848–1998, Volume II, Paying the bill for the 
Goulash communism, pp. 7–119. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 59, 71. 
11 Cseres (2004), supra note 8, p. 46.  
12 Yo Sop Choi (2014), “The Rule of Law in a Market Economy: Globalisation of 
Competition Law in Korea”, European Business Organization Law Review 15: p. 420.  
13 Id. p. 435. 
14 Ibid. 
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after this period, it took some years for the entrenchment of competition law 
which was accompanied by “economic democratisation in Korea, based on the 
social market economy and Ordoliberalism” that can “be interpreted as a means 
of ensuring competition while improving social welfare and efficiency”.15 
In spite of the neoclassical mainstream thinking in various countries of the 
Global North, social market economy and ordoliberalism were in the 
mainstream in countries such as (West) Germany during the post-World War II 
era until the Mid 1960s. Such pragmatism facilitates fair competition among 
private economic actors and at the same time avoids the risk of unregulated 
laissez-faire liberalism. The caveats of this approach are features of effective 
competition law regimes which embody mandatory standards which “do not 
restrict competition”, and at the same time aspire to eliminate the risk of “what 
is called in economic theory a ‘market for lemons’—a competition which due to 
cost incentives for lower quality forces even the ‘honourable’ trader to lower its 
standards”.16 
Effective competition can positively contribute to consumer welfare because 
it gives them “a greater choice of products”, but it can also cause problems to 
consumers owing to the “growing powers of businesses and dangers inherent in 
products”.17 Even though competition law embodies standards of conduct, 
quality and safety, these thresholds “are not always sufficient to safeguard the 
interests of those who come in contact with those products” unless emerging 
market policies also involve regulatory market intervention in addition to which 
they should be “supported by the pressures of the legal profession, academics, 
…consumers”,18 civil society organizations and the media.  
Competition law mainly targets at economic efficiency and overall social 
welfare, while consumer protection law gives due attention to the ultimate 
individual consumers of goods and services. This is because economic 
efficiency which may result from competition law is not an end in itself, but a 
means toward achieving ultimate goals including consumer welfare at individual 
and group levels. As Cseres notes, competition law “focuses on the maintenance 
of competitive markets without artificial restraints and it is more concerned with 
the general economic interests of society than with the specific interests of final 
consumers”.19  Yet, effective competition law is a prelude to the enhancement of 
wider choice in goods, services and price.  
                                           
15 Ibid. 
16 Norbert Reich (2011), “Harmonisation of European contract law: with special emphasis 
on consumer law”, China-EU Law J , Vol. 1, p. 61. 
17 Tulibacka, supra note 7. 
18 Ibid. 
19 K. J.  Cseres (2007), “The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard”. The 
Competition Law Review, Vol. 3, Issue 2. March 2007, p. 133. 
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In a free market economy, competition law facilitates fair market practices 
that are crucial to consumer welfare, but cannot substitute specific laws that 
directly deal with consumer protection. As Averit and Lande duly noted, 
“antitrust laws aim to preserve a sufficient, although not a perfect, array of 
options for consumers to choose among”; and consumer protection laws “seek 
to protect the ability of consumers to make rational choices among competing 
options”.20 Anti-trust laws widen options in the context of fair market practices 
because “effective consumer choice requires two things: options in the 
marketplace and the ability to select freely among them”.21 Averit and Lande 
further indicate the violations that hamper competition “such as price fixing and 
related horizontal restraints, anticompetitive mergers, unreasonable vertical 
restraints, and predatory pricing”; and they underline that these practices 
adversely affect consumer choice.22 These violations “can distort the supply of 
options by imposing restrictions on the variety of prices and products that the 
free market would offer”.23  
According to the Competition Commission of COMESA24 to which Ethiopia 
is a member, “[t]he purpose of competition law is to facilitate competitive 
markets, so as to promote economic efficiency, thereby generate lower prices, 
increase choice and economic growth and thus enhance the welfare of the 
general community”.25 The scope of the consumer’s choice is thus directly 
proportional to the level of fair business practices in an economy. 
2.  Prohibited Anti-competitive (Restrictive) Business Practices  
2.1  Pre-2003 laws on trade practices  
Ethiopia’s Civil Code and Commercial Code (enacted in 1960) embody a few 
provisions on prohibited commercial practices. According to Article 2057 of the 
1960 Civil Code, fault26 is committed “where a person through false 
publications, or by other means contrary to good faith … compromises the 
reputation of a product or the credit of a commercial establishment”. This is also 
stipulated under Article 132 of the 1960 Commercial Code which provides: “A 
                                           
20 W. Averit and Robert H. Lande (1998), ‘Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for 
Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law’,  Loyala Consumer Review, Vol. 10, No.1, 
p. 46. 
21 Id. pp. 46, 47. 
22 Id., p. 47. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Common Market for Southern and East Africa 
25 COMESA Competition Commission (2015), Consumer Guide to COMESA Competition 
Regulations, December 2015, p. 4.  
26 The word ‘an offence’ in Article 2057 of the Civil Code is a mistranslation of the word 
‘faute’ in the original French Version, drafted by Professor René David.  
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trader may claim damages under Article 2057 of the Civil Code from any person 
who commits an act of competition which amounts to a fault.” The duty to pay 
compensation upon unfair competition is reiterated under Article 134(1)(a) of 
the Commercial Code. Article 133 of the Code indicates cases of unfair 
competition, and Article 134 states the judicial remedies against unfair 
competition.27 Cessation of dishonest practices28 is one of the remedies if Article 
2057 of the Civil Code and Articles 133 and 134 are violated. The remedies 
stated under the Commercial Code further include the “publication, at the cost 
of the unfair competitor, of notices designed to remove the effect of the 
misleading acts or statements of the unfair competitor”.29  
Ethiopia’s specific antitrust law embodied in the Trade Practices Decree No 
50/1963 was amended by the Trade Practices Proclamation No. 228/1965. The 
Proclamation replaced various laws on price control.30 According to Art. 5(a)(ii) 
of Proclamation No. 228/1965, no dealer31 shall “engage in or become party to 
an unfair trade practice”.  
Article 3(h) of the Proclamation defined unfair trade practice as “actual or 
tacit agreement, arrangement or informal understanding” that has or is 
“designed to have the direct or indirect effect of restraining or injuring trade or 
the free competition thereon or any monopolistic, profiteering or discriminatory 
activities” that “operate or are likely to operate against the interest of the public 
whether consumers, producers, dealers or others.” The Proclamation further 
stated that no dealer shall “buy up, hoard, divert from normal trade channels or 
in any other way withhold any goods from normal use or consumption”32 or 
                                           
27 For further discussion, see Alemayehu Fentaw (2008), “Ethiopian Unfair Competition 
Law”, The University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy Working Paper 
CCLP (L) 21, pp. 6-10. Available at 
<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/cclp_l_.21.pdf> 
28 Article 2122 of the Civil Code, and Articles 134 (1)(b)  and 134 (2)(b)  of the Commercial 
Code.  
29 Articles 133 and 134, the Commercial Code. 
30 The repealed laws on price control that listed under Article 2 of Proclamation No. 
228/1965 are: 
“(a) The Imported Goods Price Control Proclamation No. 38 of 1943  as amended by 
Proclamation No. 46 of 1944 and all Legal Notices, Orders and Regulations made 
thereunder; 
(b) The Locally Produced Goods Price Control Proclamation No. 53 of 1944 and all 
Legal Notices and Orders made thereunder; 
(c) The Locally Rendered Services Price Control Proclamation No. 132 of 1952. 
31 ‘Dealer’ in Proc. No. 228/1965 is defined as “any natural or juridical person who is 
engaged in any commercial activity under Article 5 of the Commercial Code or in 
rendering any services” (Art. 3(b)). 
32 Proclamation No. 228/1965,  Article  5(a)(i). 
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“sell any declared article at a price exceeding that fixed by or in a manner 
ordered by the Minister”.33 
The Minister of Commerce and Industry was empowered to issue written 
order to declare goods or classes of goods or services “as declared articles to be 
subject to price control” where it finds that “any goods or classes of goods or 
services are in short supply or are made the subject of unfair trade practice”. 34 
Thereupon, the Minister could “issue orders in writing fixing the maximum 
prices at which such declared articles shall be sold by manufacturers, importers, 
wholesalers, or retailers or notify the formula whereby the prices of such 
declared articles shall be computed”.35 Article 4(c) of the Proclamation had 
empowered the Minister of Commerce and Industry to determine the price and 
formula “upon the advice of a special committee comprising of such members 
appointed” by the Minister of Commerce and Industry and of Minister Finance 
by, inter alia, considering the factors36 expressly stated in the provision.   
The Trade Practice Proc. No. 329/2003 marked an end to the hibernation of a 
specific anti-trust legislation on trade practices since the mid 1970s, and it can 
be regarded as “part of the worldwide surge in competition legislation” after the 
fall of socialist economies in Eastern Europe”.37 This proclamation mainly 
addressed trade competition, while the Trade Competition and Consumer 
Protection Proclamations No. 685/2010 and No. 813/2013 embody provisions 
that deal with trade competition and consumer protection.  
2.2 Anti-competitive (Restrictive) practices Prohibited under 
Proclamation No. 813/2013 
One of the core objectives stated under Article 3(1) of the TCCPP No. 813/2013 
is “to protect the business community from anti-competitive and unfair market 
practices, and also consumers from misleading market conducts, and to establish 
a system that is conducive for the promotion of competitive free market”. With 
                                           
33 Id. Article  5(a)(iii). 
34 Id. Article 4(a). 
35 Ibid. 
36 The factors stated in Article 4(c) of the Proclamation were: 
(i) cost of production; 
(ii) cost of transportation; 
(iii) turn-over; 
(iv) losses of perishable goods; 
(v) losses through obsolescence; 
(vi) the skill, intellectual activity and time required to accomplish the service. 
(vii) fair profit to the seller or to the person who renders the service. 
37 Hailegabriel G. Feyisa (2009). “European Influence on Ethiopian Antitrust Regime: A 
Comparative and Functional Analysis of Some Problems”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 3, 
No. 2, p. 272. 
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this objective in view, the Proclamation expressly identifies the anti-competitive 
practices that are prohibited, namely, abuse of market dominance,38 anti-
competitive agreements, concerted practices and decisions,39 and unfair 
competition.40 The Proclamation also regulates merger by stating prohibited acts 
in this regard,41 the procedures of notification,42 approval,43 registration44 and 
revocation of approval45 of merger. 
2.2.1 Abuse of market dominance 
A business person either on his/her/its own “or acting together with others in a 
relevant market, is deemed to have a dominant market position if [he/she/it] has 
the actual capacity to control prices or other conditions of commercial 
negotiations or eliminate or utterly restrain competition in the relevant 
market”.46 This may be assessed “by taking into account the business person’s 
share in the market”47 or the capacity of the business person “to set barriers 
against the entry of others into the market or other factors as may be appropriate 
or a combination of these factors”.48  
According to Article 5(1), “[n]o business person, either by himself or acting 
together with others, may carry on commercial activity by openly or dubiously 
abusing the dominant position he has in the market.” Eight categories of acts are 
considered as acts of abuse of market dominance under Art. 5(2).  The first four 
prohibitions stated under Art. 5(2)(a) to 5(2)(d) are categorical and have no 
exception. The phrase “without justifiable economic reasons” in the prohibitions 
listed under 5(2)(e) to 5(2)(h) ‘shows that the prohibitions can have exceptions.  
Article 5(3) lists down exceptions that can be considered as “justifiable 
economic reasons for the purpose of applying the provisions of paragraphs (e), 
(f), (g) and (h) of Article 5(2).  Although the acts of abuse of market dominance 
refer to the prohibited practices of business persons in their relations with 
competitors, such acts ultimately distort the scope of choice of consumers –in 
price, goods and services.   
                                           
38 Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No. 813/2013, Arts. 5 and 6. 
39 Id., Art. 7. 
40 Id., Art. 8. 
41 Id., Art. 9. 
42 Id., Art. 10. 
43 Id., Art. 11. 
44 Id., Art. 12. 
45 Id., Art. 13. 
46 Id., Art. 6(1).   
47 The market that is relevant in the assessment of a dominant position “is the market that 
comprises goods or services that actually compete with each other or goods or services 
that can be replaced by one another.” (Art. 6/4). 
48 Art.  6(2).   
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2.2.2  Horizontal anti-competitive agreements, concerted practices or decisions 
Agreements49 between or concerted practices50 of business persons or any 
decision by an association of business persons in a horizontal relationship51 are 
prohibited under the following situations stated under Article 7. The first relates 
to the consequence of the agreement, concerted practice of the decision, while 
the second refers to the nature of the act. The first prohibition refers to the 
agreement, concerted practice or decision that “has the effect of preventing or 
significantly lessening competition, unless a party to the agreement, concerted 
practice or decision can prove that any technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain resulting from it outweighs that effect”.52 The second 
prohibition is where a horizontal agreement, concerted practice or decision by 
an association of business persons in a horizontal relationship “involves, directly 
or indirectly, fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition, 
collusive tendering, or dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, 
territories or specific types of goods or services”.53 
2.2.3  Prohibited vertical agreements  
Article 7(2) prohibits an agreement between business persons in a vertical 
relationship54 if it either prevents or significantly lessens competition, “unless a 
party to the agreement can prove that any technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain resulting from it outweighs that effect” or where it “involves 
the setting of minimum resale price”. The first prohibition is conditional and it 
allows balancing between the technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive 
gains to be obtained vis-à-vis preventing or lessening competition. This seems to 
be too general and susceptible to wide interpretation. The second condition 
regarding the prohibition of a vertical agreement that sets a minimum resale 
price is not subject to any exception.  
2.2.4  Unfair competition  
The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No. 813/2013 
(like the previous proclamations, e.g. Art. 10 of Proclamation 329/2003 and Art. 
                                           
49 Agreement “includes mutual understanding, written or oral contract and operational 
procedures, whether or not legally enforceable”. (Art. 7(3)(a)). 
50 ‘Concerted practice’ means “a unified or cooperative conduct of business persons 
depicted in a way that does not look like an agreement and done to substitute individual 
activity”. (Art. 7(3)(b)). 
51 Horizontal relationship “is deemed to exist between competing business persons in a 
certain market.” (Art. 7(3)(c)) 
52 Art. 7(1)(a). 
53 Art. 7(1)(b). 
54 Vertical relationship “is deemed to exist between business persons and their customers or 
suppliers or both.” (Art. 7(3)(c)). 
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21 of Proclamation No. 685/2010) gives further clarity to unfair competition, 
and adds elements to the definition provided under Article 2057 of the Civil 
Code and Article 133 of the Commercial Code.  Art. 8(1) of the Proclamation 
provides: “No business person may, in the course of trade, carry out any act 
which is dishonest, misleading or deceptive, and harms or is likely to harm the 
business interest of a competitor”. Illustrative instances of unfair competition 
are enumerated under Art. 8(2). With regard to the direct concerns of 
consumers, this provision, inter alia, prohibits “comparing goods or services 
falsely or equivocally in the course of commercial advertisement”55 and it 
forbids the dissemination of “false or equivocal information” which may include 
“information the source of which is not known, in connection with the price or 
nature or system of manufacturing or manufacturing place or content or 
suitableness for use or quality of goods or services”.56 
2.3  Regulation of merger  
Articles 549 to 554 of the Commercial Code regulate amalgamation of firms. 
These provisions give prime focus to procedural issues and the rights of 
creditors. The TCCPP goes beyond these concerns and prohibits “an agreement 
or arrangement of merger57 that causes or is likely to cause a significant adverse 
effect on trade competition”.58 The Proclamation states that any agreement or 
arrangement of merger may come into effect only upon “obtaining approval 
from the Trade Competition and Consumers Protection Authority”.59    
Upon receiving notification of the proposed agreement or arrangement of 
merger,60 the Authority shall “investigate the possible adverse effect of the 
proposed merger on trade competition”61 in the course of which it may, where 
deemed necessary require the parties “to submit additional information or 
document within a specified period of time”.62 The Authority shall also “invite, 
                                           
55 Art. 8(2)(d). 
56 Art. 8(2)(e). 
57 “For the purpose of applying the provisions of this Article merger shall be deemed to have 
occurred: 
a) when two or more business organizations previously having independent existence 
amalgamate or when such business organizations pool the whole or part of their 
resources for the purpose of carrying on a certain commercial activity; or 
b) by directly or indirectly acquiring shares, securities or assets of a business organization 
or taking control of the management of the business of another person by a person or 
group of persons through purchase or any other means.” (Art. 8(3) of Proclamation No. 
813/2013). 
58 Art. 9(1). 
59 Id., Art 9(2). 
60 Id., Art. 10(1). 
61 Id., Art. 10(2). 
62 Id., Art. 10(3)(a). 
42                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 11, No.1                              September 2017  
 
 
by a notice published on a newspaper having wide circulation, any business 
person who is likely to be affected by the said merger, to submit his written 
objections, if any, within 15 days from the date of publication of the notice”.63  
After the investigation of the proposed merger, the Authority shall approve 
the merger if it is “not likely to have any significant adverse effect on trade 
competition”64 or “subject to certain conditions”, if it is of the opinion that the 
likely significant adverse effect of the merger on trade competition can be 
eliminated by complying with the conditions attached thereto”.65 Subject to the 
exception stated under Art. 13(1), the Authority shall not approve the merger “if 
it is of the opinion that the merger is likely to have a significant adverse effect 
on trade competition”.66 However, it “may approve a merger proposal where the 
merger is likely to result in technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive 
gain that outweigh the significant adverse effects of the merger on competition, 
and such gain may not otherwise be obtained if the merger is prohibited”.67 The 
approval of merger may be revoked by the TCCP Authority where the Authority 
“discovers that the approval was obtained based on the presentation of false or 
fraudulent evidence” or if “the conditions on the basis of which the approval has 
been obtained are not fulfilled”.68  
3. Administrative Enforcement and Gaps 
3.1 Administrative Enforcement under the Proclamation  
The TCCPA is entrusted with the task of regulating trade practices and 
consumer protection. It provides “support to industrial self-regulation in order to 
enable various industrial sectors regulate anti-competitive and unfair trade 
practices”69 and organizes “judicial organs with jurisdiction on issues of trade 
competition and consumers protection”.70 According to Article 30 of the TCCP 
Proclamation, it undertakes study and research in connection with trade 
competition and consumer protection, and initiate policy proposals”71 and 
decides on “merger notifications in accordance with the provisions of this 
Proclamation”72  
                                           
63 Id., Art. 10(3)(b).  
64 Id.,  11(1)(a). 
65 Id., 11(1)(c).   
66 Id., Art. 11(1)(b) 
67 Id., Art. 11(2). 
68 Id., Art. 13(1). 
69 Id. Art. 30(10). 
70 Id. Art. 30(9). 
71 Id. Art. 30(4). 
72 Id. Art. 30(3). 
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The adjudicative benches of the TCCP Authority “shall have the judicial 
power to impose administrative penalties 73 which, in accordance with Article 42 
of the Proclamation, can include “a fine from 5% up to 10%” of the business 
person’s turnover if there is abuse of dominance,74 unfair competition75 and 
prohibited merger76 in violation of Articles 5, 8 and 9, respectively.  The fine 
payable for anticompetitive horizontal and vertical agreements –prohibited 
under Articles 7(1) and 7(2)– shall be 10% of the business person’s turnover.77 
Article 42(2) of the Proclamation further embodies criminal penalties.  
The administrative penalties stated in the Proclamation are imposed by the 
adjudicative benches of the Authority.78 In addition to fine, the administrative 
measures may include “(a) the discontinuation of the act pronounced unfair”; (b) 
“any other appropriate measure that enables to reinstate the victim’s competitive 
position;” or (c) “the suspension or revocation of the business license of the 
offender”.79 
There are activities of the Authority that are commendable. For example, it 
has, in July 2017, “sued Ambo Mineral Water PLC and the East African 
Bottling Company for undergoing an illegal merger” without notification to the 
Authority.80 The suit states that the participation of the companies in unfair trade 
practices and it presents their acts as unlawful merger in violation of fair trade 
practices. In spite of various commendable pursuits and achievements of the 
Authority, there are gaps in its autonomy and scope of functions that need to be 
addressed as highlighted below.  
3.2  Gaps in the Autonomy and Powers of the TCCP Authority  
Article 27(1) of the Proclamation states that the Authority is an “autonomous 
federal government body having its own legal personality.” This envisages 
independence in the appointment of the Director General and the judges of the 
tribunals. However, The Authority is accountable to the Ministry of Trade (Art. 
27/1).  The Director General is appointed by the Prime Minister (Art. 28/1), and 
judges of the Federal Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Appellate 
Tribunal shall be appointed by the Prime Minister (Art. 35/1).   
                                           
73 Id Art. 32 (1)(a). 
74 Id Art. 42 (1). 
75 Id Art. 42 (3). 
76 Id Art. 42 (4). 
77 Id Art. 42 (2). 
78 Id Art. 32 (1) 
79 Id Art. 32 (2). 
80 Dawit Endeshaw, The Reporter, 15 July 2017, Available at: 
<http://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/beverage-companies-hot-water>. Last 
visited: 28 July 2017. 
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As Kahsay81 observes, the autonomy of the Authority would be directly or 
indirectly affected due to (a) the accountability of TCCPA to the Ministry of 
Trade, (b) the power of the Prime Minister to appoint the Director General of 
TCCPA and the judges of the appellate tribunal, (c) “the application of the civil 
service law to judges of the authority”, (d) “the power of council of ministers to 
approve annual budget of the authority”, and (e) “absence of ... private sector 
representation in the competition authority”.82 Harka’s observations83 further 
substantiate the need for the independence of the Authority because situations 
may arise where the Ministry could appear as a respondent in a litigation that 
involves consumer protection. He cites a case (adjudicated at the Commission 
that was established based on the Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003)84 
in which the Ministry was plaintiff.   
Comparable with the Auditor General, the Authority could be directly 
accountable to the House of People’s Representatives. It is, however, to be 
noted that such independence and rendering the Authority accountable to the 
House of People’s Representatives should be accompanied by (a) law reform in 
administrative laws which not only empowers but also controls such authorities 
under clear administrative procedures and judicial review, and (b) effective 
judicial reform which enhances predictability, wider access to justice, judicial 
decisions without delay and public confidence. 
The representation of stakeholders in the Authority and its adjudication 
organs can enhance autonomy and effectiveness. As Tessema observes, non- 
representation of stakeholders in the Authority “can contribute to challenges in 
enforcement because trade competition and consumer protection in a market 
economy involve the interests of the business community and consumers in 
addition to the government”.85 Such empowerment of stakeholders is part of the 
bigger setting which should allow the private sector to become the engine of 
Ethiopia’s economic activities, commensurate with the pledges made in various 
policy documents including Growth and Transformation Plans.   
                                           
81  First names are used for Ethiopian authors (unless used otherwise by the authors 
themselves) because surnames in official documents such as passports are not family 
names as such, but a grandfather’s first name.  
82 Kahsay G. Medhin (2016). “Ethiopian Competition Law: Appraisal of Institutional 
Autonomy”, International Journal of Innovative Research & Development, Vol. 5, Issue 
2, p. 84. 
83 Harka Haroye (2008). “Competition Policies and Laws: Major Concepts and an Overview 
of Ethiopian Trade Practice Law”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 2008, p. 50. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Tessema Elias (2015),”Gaps and Challenges in the Enforcement Framework for 
Consumer Protection in Ethiopia”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, September 2015, p. 
97. 
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Another challenge that needs to be noted relates to the fragmentation of 
regulatory monitoring and enforcement. For example, there are overlapping 
functions between regulatory offices with respect to acts such as misleading 
advertising which is prohibited under both the Advertising Proclamation 
759/2012 and the TCCP Proclamation (enforced respectively by the Ethiopian 
Broadcasting Authority and TCCP Authority). Overlapping mandates between 
regulatory offices creates problems in the implementation of the TCCP 
Proclamation. 
Moreover, there is ambiguity whether TCCPA can regulate the trade 
practices of state-owned enterprises. A case in point is the merger of the 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and the Construction and Business Bank (CBB) 
in December 2015/ January 2016. The issue is whether TCCPA should have 
examined the effect of the merger on the interests of private banks, and whether 
the decision of the Council of Ministers would suffice as stated under the Public 
Enterprises Proclamation No. 25/1992 which merely requires the decision of the 
Council of Ministers86 upon the proposal of the Public Financial Enterprises 
Agency. Unless the TCCP Authority is empowered to ensure fair trade practices 
in all business enterprises (private and public), such gaps are bound to continue 
thereby causing a double standard in the definition of anti-competitive practices 
as applied to private economic actors and state owned enterprises.  
4. Comparative Experience in State Intervention toward Private 
Sector Empowerment –versus- Predatory Interventions 
4.1  Domestic private sector empowerment through protectionism, but 
without patronage: 18th century neo-mercantilist interventions   
Although productivity and competitiveness are crucial in developing economies, 
the private sector in these countries cannot nurture its competitiveness in the 
context of the neo-liberal laissez-faire (non-interventionist) state. It was under 
comparable circumstances that neo-mercantilist views were forwarded in the 
18th and 19th centuries by Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804) and Friedrich List 
(1789–1846).  Both wanted their countries (i.e. the United States and Germany) 
“to maintain a positive balance of trade, and to increase industrial exports which 
had long-term advantages over raw material exports”.87  
Hamilton was the first US Secretary of Treasury, and in his 1791 Report on 
the Subject of Manufacture, “argued that the United States could preserve its 
independence and security only by promoting economic development through 
                                           
86 Article 35(1) of the Public Enterprises Proclamation No. 25/1992. 
87 Theodore H. Cohn (2016), Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice, Seventh 
Edition , Routledge, p. 58 
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industrialization, government intervention, and protectionism”.88 Hamilton 
considered the intervention of the US government “as necessary to promote 
industrialization, because Britain as the only industrialized power discouraged 
manufacturing in its colonies”. He argued that “to counter Britain’s advantages, 
the U.S. government had to promote the use of foreign technology, capital, and 
skilled labor and adopt protectionist policies such as tariffs and quotas to bolster 
its fledgling industries”.89  
Friedrich List held similar views and he “emphasized the importance of 
manufacturing for a state’s economic development”.90 According to List, “a 
nation which exchanges agricultural products for foreign manufactured goods is 
an individual with one arm, which is supported by a foreign arm”.91 He stated 
that “Germany and the United States could catch up with the British only by 
providing protection for their infant industries,”92 and argued that “late 
industrializers (the United States and Germany at the time) required more 
government involvement if they were to “catch up” with Britain—the leading 
state”.93 However, Friedrich List had a double standard with regard to the 
Global South because “he ruled out industrialization for the South” stating that 
the countries in the North “were ‘specially fitted by nature for manufacturing,’ 
whereas Southern states should provide the North with ‘colonial produce in 
exchange for their manufactured goods’.”94 
Although Hamilton advocated for state intervention to protect manufacturers 
in the US (from British manufactured goods), he was against excessive 
patronage from government.  He believed that the private sector should be left 
to itself without the need of “endeavor by the extraordinary patronage of 
Government, to accelerate the growth of manufactures”.95  
Indeed, it can hardly ever be wise in a government, to attempt to give a 
direction to the industry of its citizens. This under the quick sighted guidance 
of private interest, will, if left to itself, infallibly find its own way to the most 
profitable employment: and ’tis by such employment, that the public 




91 Ibid, citing (in FN 16) Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (1841), 
trans. Sampson S. Lloyd (London: Longmans, Green 1916), p. 130. 
92 Ibid 
93 Id., at 339.  
94 Id. at 67, citing (in FN 65) List, The National System of Political Economy, p. 154. 
95 Alexander Hamilton’s Final Version of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures, 
Philadelphia, December 5, 1791,  Communicated on December 5, 1791] (To the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives),  Available at: 
<https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-10-02-0001-0007>, Accessed 05 
August, 2017 
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prosperity will be most effectually promoted. To leave industry to itself, 
therefore, is, in almost every case, the soundest as well as the simplest 
policy.96 
Hamilton thus argued in favour of protectionism from imports, and he 
meanwhile opposed excessive patronage in the activities of the private sector. 
Although protectionism was effective during the 18th and 19th centuries, it could 
not be viable since the 1960s. For example, there were various developing 
countries that pursued economic policies influenced by the dependency theory97 
according to which  developing countries merely serve as passive ‘peripheries’ 
in the supply of raw material  to the ‘core’ world economy.98 The pursuits of 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) of the late 1960s and 1970s did not 
materialize in most developing countries that did not blend import reduction 
with export enhancement. As the experience of some countries in East Asia 
(indicated below) has proven, the viable path under the global age goes beyond 
import substitution.  
4.2  20th century developmental state intervention toward private sector 
empowerment 
Countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore pursued export-led 
growth in lieu of protectionism and import substitution, and this required state 
intervention to support the private sector toward the enhancement of agricultural 
transformation and manufacturing. In these countries, export enhancement did 
not mean increase in the export of unprocessed prime food products such as 
crops and fruits (thereby creating shortage of supply and steady rise in prices in 
the local market), but it meant enhanced export of value added manufacturing 
and processed agri-business products that are labour intensive during the initial 
phases. The State intervention in these countries was not driven by economic 
theories as such, but rather involved pragmatic policies, decisions and 
regulations in response to reason and clearly observable facts on the ground. 
The modus operandi of these states and their steady achievements were post 
facto analyzed and interpreted to explain the practices and pursuits of 
developmental states.  
                                           
96 Alexander Hamilton’s Final Version of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures, 
Philadelphia, December 5, 1791,  Communicated on December 5, 1791] (To the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives),  Available at: 
    <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-10-02-0001-0007>, Accessed 05 
August, 2017. 
97  See, for example, Andre Gunder Frank (1966), The Development of Underdevelopment, 
Monthly Review, September 1966.  
98 See also, Andre Gunder Frank (1967) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America, London: Monthly Review Press. 
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Owing to the current wave of globalization, protectionism –in its variant of 
neo-mercantilism– seems to be outdated.  On the other hand, the private sector 
in developing countries cannot thrive and be competitive in the context of the 
neo-liberal laissez-faire (non-interventionist) state due to the race (in the global 
economy) between unequal competitors. East Asian developmental states of the 
1960s were thus “immersed in a dense network of ties that [bound] them to 
societal allies with transformational goals”99 to support the private sector, while 
at the same time retaining their autonomy.  
As Evans notes, a state can be called developmental if “embeddedness and 
autonomy are joined together”.100 This “embedded autonomy, not just 
autonomy, gives the developmental state its efficacy”:101  
Embeddedness provides sources of intelligence and channels of 
implementation that enhance the competence of the state. Autonomy 
complements embeddedness, protecting the state from piecemeal capture, 
which would destroy the cohesiveness of the state itself and eventually 
undermine the coherence of its social interlocutors. The state’s corporate 
coherence enhances the cohesiveness of external networks and helps groups 
that share its vision overcome their own collective action problems. Just as 
predatory states deliberately disorganize society, developmental states help 
organize it.102 
Vartiainen, indicates three salient features of a successful developmental 
state. Its first feature is its strength in the implementation of collective 
developmental objectives, meritocracy and insulation “from both the market and 
the logic of individual utility maximization”. The second feature of a 
developmental state is its embeddedness as manifested in its “thick external ties 
to the economy’s organized agents such as corporations, industrialists, 
associations and trade unions.” And thirdly, a developmental state has “a 
relationship of mutual dependence or mutual balance between the state and the 
rest of the economy” in such a manner that the state can be “able to ‘discipline’ 
economic actors such as firms and trade unions, while appreciating that their 
privileged positions ultimately depend on the success of the economy”.103  
                                           
99 Peter Evans (1995), Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation,  
Princeton University Press, p. 248. 
100 Id. at 12.  
101 Id. at 248. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Juhana Vartiainen, “The Economics of Successful State Intervention in Industrial 
Transformation” in The Developmental State (1999), Edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings 
(Cornell University Press) pp. 218-219 [in E. N. Stebek (2013), “Overview of Country 
Experience in Land Rights and Developmental Statehood”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 7, 
No. 2, pp. 212, 213. 
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Amsden also notes the balance between providing assistance to the private 
sector and at the same time the capacity to monitor and discipline the sector.  
She states that the effective industrialization in countries such as Korea, Japan 
and Taiwan can be attributed to the state’s “power to discipline big business, 
and thereby to dispense subsidies to big business according to a more effective 
set of allocative principles”. 104  
The term ‘disciplining’ the private sector does not mean suppression or 
patronage, but merely means facilitation, support and monitoring. Evans states 
the challenges in enhancing a competitive market under a setting of oligopolistic 
networks in the private sector that is not harnessed, and he observes that 
“[p]rivate capital, especially private capital organized into tight oligopolistic 
networks, is unlikely to provide itself with a competitive market”.105  The state 
cannot thus be “a passive register of these oligopolistic interests” and should 
facilitate the conditions which “they are unwilling to provide for themselves” 
because only a state “that is capable of acting autonomously can provide this 
essential ‘collective good’.”106 
During such state intervention, embeddedness facilitates “information and 
implementation, but without autonomy, embeddedness will degenerate into a 
super-cartel, aimed, like all cartels, at protecting its members from changes in 
the status quo”.107 Both aspects of the intervention (i.e. embeddedness and 
autonomy) involve competence, commitment and integrity in the state 
apparatus. Meritocracy was the bedrock of recruitment and appointment in all 
government organs of developmental states. This enabled the members of the 
state apparatus to be professionally competent and motivated in the course of 
facilitating information and implementation, while integrity ensured autonomy 
from private benefits in the course of the private sector’s economic gains.   
To this end, they acted as coherent entities within the units of the state and in 
the course of facilitating the pursuits of private economic actors. The coherence 
of such states “involves more than just reining in the greed of individual 
officeholders” and it further “involves entrepreneurship” in helping “formulate 
projects that go beyond responding to the immediate demands of politically 
powerful constituents”.108 
                                           
104 A. H. Amsden (1989), Asia’s Next Grant,: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New 
York: Oxford University Press, p. 144. [[in E. N. Stebek (2013), “Overview of Country 
Experience in Land Rights and Developmental Statehood”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 7, 
No. 2, p. 212). 
105 Evans, supra note 99 at 57. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Id., at 57, 58. 
108 Ibid. 
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Although the developmental states of the 1960s were authoritarian, they were 
meritocratic and committed to the collective good. They controlled predatory 
greed in the state apparatus (and the business sector), not only via legal 
articulations but mainly through leading by example, i.e., by living and doing as 
they ‘preached’. The officeholders in these developmental states did not aspire 
to be billionaires, but rather cherished the success of private economic actors.  
Since the mid 1970s, however, there was a stage when autonomy gradually 
receded in East Asia’s developmental states (such as South Korea) due to the 
gradual formal and informal bondage between the political and the business 
elites. This marked a phase in which developmental statehood became obsolete 
and outlived its usefulness.109 The political and socio-economic transition in 
these countries eventually led to mature market economy and constitutional 
democracy since the 1980s.  
4.3  The nature of predatory state intervention 
State power in predatory states is “used for capricious extraction and wasteful 
consumption” and this “diminishes private productive capacities rather than 
enhancing them. Welfare and growth both suffer”.110 They fail to realize the 
risks toward fragility and failed statehood even though extreme impoverishment 
and crisis can ultimately destroy their dreamland. Yet, they usually cherish the 
trap threshold which weakens civil societies and stunts an entrepreneurial (and 
vibrant) private sector. The observations of Evans clarify this trap: 
Extracting a larger share from a shrinking pie is not the optimal way to 
maximize revenues, but it may be the only way consistent with the survival 
of predatory states. The disorganization of civil society is the sine qua non of 
political survival for predatory rulers. Generating an entrepreneurial class 
with an interest in industrial transformation would be almost as dangerous as 
promoting the political organization of civil society. For predatory states, 
‘low-level equilibrium traps’ are not something to be escaped; they are 
something to be cherished.111 
Predatory states do not base their ‘legitimacy’ on genuine consent, a political 
myth, a country-wide mission or theory. They rather resort to simulations, lies 
and repression which are all expensive and budget-intensive. Thus, the more 
untrustworthy and repressive a predatory government becomes, the closer it gets 
to its eventual downfall in spite of such ‘low-level equilibrium traps’.  
                                           
109 See for example, Eun Mee Kim (1993), “Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental 
State: With Illustrations from the South Korean Case” Social Problems, Vol. 40, No. 2 
(May, 1993) pp. 231-232. 
110 Id., at 247. 
111 Id. at 248. 
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4.4 Challenges in the effectiveness of trade competition in developing 
countries  
Unlike the neo-mercantilist protectionism that was accorded to domestic 
manufacturers in the USA and Germany (highlighted in Section 4.1), and the 
state intervention to support the private sector in developmental states (indicated 
in Section 4.2), state intervention in most developing countries seems predatory. 
Aydin and Büthe note that most developing countries “exhibit high levels of 
both economic and political inequality; some still have autocratic regimes in 
which insiders use their political power to extract economic rents by restricting 
market entry” while “others have leaders who for their political survival depend 
upon the support of entrenched economic insiders”. 112  
According to Aydin and Büthe, these conditions “ensure powerful 
opposition to the meaningful implementation of any competition law”.113 
In many of the new competition law jurisdictions, the state retains a large 
ownership stake in many industries or is still expected to guide outputs and 
inputs of the private sector. Moreover, in a number of these jurisdictions, 
corruption is rampant in the executive branch, and the judiciary is far from 
[being] independent, contributing to generally poor rule of law and limited 
access to justice.114 
Aydin and Büthe have identified resource constraints, unsupportive or hostile 
political–legal Environment, lack of competition culture115 and institutionally 
underdeveloped markets.116  They noted the resource constraints at three levels: 
“financial resources for the competition agency; legal and economic expertise 
within the implementation/ enforcement agency; and antitrust and economic 
expertise within the judiciary”.117 Their observations regarding unsupportive or 
hostile political-legal environment include “weak rule of law and low judicial 
                                           
112 Umut Aydin & Tim Büthe, Competition Law & Policy in Developing Countries: 
Explaining Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits, 79 Law and 




115  “Distrust toward—or at least anxiety regarding—market mechanisms is common in 
many developing countries, …, [and] the normative commitment to market competition 
as the fundamental principle of economic relations is in many developing countries 
weak—among economic elites as well as in society at large.” (Id. at 20) 
116 “Competition law and policy can only improve the performance of a market economy if 
there actually is a market—a market that, absent anti-competitive structures and conduct, 
is functional. Two types of contextual factors render markets too dysfunctional to support 
an effective competition policy: institutional deficiencies, … and market imperfections 
created by geographical and other physical constraints…”  (Id. at pp. 21, 22). 
117 Id. at 15. 
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independence” in many developing countries that have adopted competition 
laws”, and these challenges are exacerbated by gaps in ‘access to justice’ and 
completion policy enforcement.118  
They further indicated that “often-pervasive corruption exacerbates the 
problem by creating uncertainty about the impartiality of competition law 
enforcement whenever suspicion of corruption extends to the judiciary or the 
competition agency”.119 The close alliance that is created “between entrenched 
economic elites in oligopolistic industries and a small group of political 
insiders” is, according to Aydin and Büthe, meant to “(re)distribute a larger 
share of the national income to themselves”.120  
These observations are substantiated by the remarks of Abel Mateus, former 
President of the Portuguese Competition Authority. He indicated three factors 
that adversely affect the effectiveness of a competition enforcement regime.121 
The first factor relates to “vested interests that dominate economic policy 
making, either through legal means … or illegal means (corruption, abuse of 
public service power, or cronyism)”.122 He further noted “inefficient public 
administration and regulatory systems that limit the capacity and effectiveness 
of public bodies, including the NCA [National Competition Authority]”,123 and 
“inefficient judicial systems that preclude the sanctioning of violation of the 
competition law” as impediments to the effective enforcement of the trade 
competition regime. 
5. Economic Elite and ‘Endowment’ Pressures on Ethiopia’s 
Private Sector  
Private sector empowerment is broad-based so that the competitors operate in 
the context of a vibrant economy whereby the demand and supply side of goods 
and services are undertaken by millions of persons who are actively engaged in 
the process. This requires effective competition under conducive socio-
economic realities and political will. As Pamela Samuelson duly noted, “people 
don't adopt rules just because they are clear or consistent; they adopt rules 
                                           
118 Id. at 18. 
119 Id. at 19. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Abel Mateus, in Competition and Development (D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2013) at 
115–16 [cited (Fn75) in A.E. Rodriguez & Ashok Menon, The Causes of Competition 
Agency Ineffectiveness in Developing Countries, 79 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 37-67 (2016), p. 59] Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol79/iss4/2 
122 Ibid. 
123 Id., at 59, 60. 
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because they make sense in ordering human affairs”.124 The laws and 
institutional framework (highlighted in Sections 2 and 3, above) should thus be 
examined not only in terms of their clarity and consistency, but particularly in 
light of their effectiveness in regulating social conduct. 
There should be strong and viable competitors for competition law to be 
effective. This does not, however, undermine the significance of Ethiopia’s 
competition law, but rather shows that the law can hardly bring about fair trade 
practices and consumer welfare in the absence of fair competition. Tessema 
states that various researchers have “identified public sector dominance” and 
“unfair competition from party-affiliate enterprises” accompanied by inadequate 
awareness “among business community and enforcers as some of the main 
causes for limited competition”. 125  
Such non-private sector market dominance in chemical fertilizers, for 
example, does not only adversely affect market competition, but also involves 
conflicts of interest between increasing revenue from sale and the distribution of 
chemical fertilizers vis-à-vis the role of the state in giving due attention to 
environmental sustainability –in accordance with its pledges of green 
development. Where, for example, a political party affiliated endowment or a 
state agency is a major importer of pesticides and chemical fertilizers, conflict 
of interest is likely to arise between the pursuits of enhancing sale vis-à-vis 
sustainable land management (SLM).  
An issue arises at this juncture whether ‘developmental patrimonialism’ 
justifies the Ethiopian variant of intervention in the economy.  A study by 
Vaughan and Gebremichael126 “suggests that contemporary Ethiopia shows key 
features consonant with the concept of ‘developmental patrimonialism’, which 
under certain circumstances has been conducive to transformational economic 
growth in other parts of the world”.127 However, their research “supports the 
general perception that business and politics are closely linked in Ethiopia” and 
their study “has examined one specific instance of ideologically driven 
engagement by politicians in the commercial arena”.128 They also state the 
                                           
124 Pamela Samuelson (1984), “Good Legal Writing: of Orwell and Window Panes” 46 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 149 (Fall 1984), p. 164.  Available at < Available 
at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/1050> 
125 Tessema Elias, supra note 85, p. 96. 
126  As indicated in Footnote 81, first names are usually used in Ethiopia for in-text reference 
to authors. However, Mesfin Gebremichael’s patronymic is used in accordance with the 
usage of the authors in infra note 127. 
127 Sarah Vaughan and Mesfin Gebrehiwot (2011), Rethinking business and politics in 
Ethiopia The role of EFFORT, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray, 
Africa Power and Politics, Research Report 02, August 2011, p. 12.  
128 Id., at 59. 
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caveat that developmental patrimonialism becomes successful not only by 
enabling the pot to grow, but it should also “ensure reasonably equitable and 
sustainable access to it”.129 On the contrary, “a transition economy of low 
productivity, poorly co-ordinated markets and opportunistic rents, unregulated 
entrepreneurialism has frequently led to non-developmental kleptocracy”. 130   
Vaughan and Gebremichael state the transitional context in which “the 
Ethiopian government is reluctant to rely on a private sector” due to “some 
elements of which it sees as rent-seeking, law-breaking and [being] 
uncooperative”.  They also indicate that the economy’s continued emphasis on 
political ties “undoubtedly carries an alternative set of risks, not least the 
political capture of resources which are not then used to serve economically 
productive or sustainable developmental ends”.131 
Another risk is the tendency for developmental patrimonialism to degenerate 
into less economically productive forms in cases where regimes with strong 
leadership continuity experience succession crises. This is potentially a 
further set of challenges that Ethiopia and its ruling party have yet to 
demonstrate they will be able to transcend.132 
Developmental patrimonialism (as indicated in Section 4.2, above) was 
successful in the developmental states of the 1960s and early 1970s as a 
transition toward empowering private economic actors and domestic 
industrialization. However, it was not an end it itself, as observed from the 
success of developmental states in East Asia which marked their obsolescence 
and the ultimate transition of these states to mature market economy since the 
1980s.133 
6. Hedged Ideology -versus- Overt ‘Market-friendly’ Marxism  
The experience of the transition economies such as Eastern Europe does not 
justify the Ethiopian setting which seems to be caught in the midst of a trap that 
involves pledges of a market economy without a broad-based private sector as 
its key actor. It is to be noted that the transition economies of East Europe did 
not procrastinate in the empowerment of the private sector. A question may also 
arise whether there is another option that enables a blend between a political 
entity’s Marxist disposition and a broad-based private sector empowerment. 
                                           
129 Id., at 60. 
130 Ibid.  
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 See, E. N. Stebek (2013), “Overview of Country Experience in Land Rights and 
Developmental Statehood”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 218-221; see also, 
Kim (1993), supra note 109. 
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There are countries such as China and Nicaragua whereby communists did 
not hedge their ideology. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas134 (who were Marxists) 
tolerated political pluralism, while countries such as Cuba sustained their 
policies for decades despite the fall of the Eastern Block. It is to be noted that 
“the private sector with large, medium, small and micro entrepreneurs existed in 
Nicaragua throughout the revolutionary government’s tenure”.135  In fact “the 
revolutionary government made the private sector a key part of the national 
economy”.136 The private sector “retained its independence and was 
instrumental in the electoral defeat of the revolutionaries”.137 Eventually, the 
Sandinistas managed to win elections, which ultimately seems to have led to 
contested election processes, particularly after Daniel Ortega managed to stay in 
power for a third term after the ‘amendment’ of Nicaragua’s Constitution.138  
The initial phase of tolerance and pluralism seems to have been replaced by 
dominance and hegemony. 
China, on the other hand, retained its one-party state policy, and has rather 
given primacy to economic reforms (by blending market economy and 
socialism) unlike USSR’s reforms that gave primacy to political restructuring 
under Gorbachev. Ethiopia has not pursued the Chinese or the Nicaraguan path. 
The party in power since 1991 was Marxist throughout its years of struggle, but 
it could not sustain its ideology after the downfall of the Eastern Block.  In spite 
of its pledges to embrace market economy, the Marxist past seems to create 
conflicting patterns in policymaking, legislation and their implementation. 
In China, the Marxist political identity is not forfeited but blended with the 
market economy. However, there is always a challenge when the past 
subconsciously guides the present in the form of reflexive decisions rather than 
a carefully synthesized and blended policy choice. The latter is the case in China 
where the Communist Party attributes its legitimacy to an ideology, and not the 
ballot box.  
The Nicaraguan and Chinese models represent regimes that do not conceal or 
deny their political ideology. When Marxist ideology is hedged or concealed, 
while on the other hand the market economy is claimed to be pursued, the 
reflexive intervention of the mindset adversely affects sound economic 
policymaking and its implementation. Meanwhile, the identity crisis in ideology 
becomes conducive to graver oligopolistic realities thereby creating the fusion 
                                           
134 Sandinista National Liberation Front (Spanish: Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, 
FSLN). 
135 David Close (1999), Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years, Boulder, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, p. 19. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 See, for example the Guardian, 7 November 2016.  
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of political influence and economic rent in the conduct of many officeholders. 
The Ethiopian setting seems to be in the midst of this trap whereby the private 
sector has not yet managed to be at the wheels as opposed to various pledges 
and official statements. Under such setting, the ‘deliverables’ of a socialist 
economy, in spite of their mediocrity and inadequacy (housing, modest house 
rentals, subsidized food prices, ration card sale for basic commodities, 
smallholder farmer or communal farm landholding security, etc.) are eroded 
without the corresponding realization of the gains in market economy.  
7.  Towards Nurturing Tax Compliance and a Broader Tax Base  
Tax compliance envisages standards of conduct in a country’s value system 
which can nurture the thoughts, actions and habits of taxpayers to perform their 
tax obligations willingly and comfortably. Tax non-compliance, on the other 
hand, prompts tax enforcement which constitutes an aspect of law enforcement, 
and it may involve penalties and deterrence. However, unlike various violations 
that involve law enforcement, tax authorities do not “start from a crime and 
work backward to suspects, but scan” for tax records139 and primarily address 
the root causes.  
From the perspective of individual ‘rewards’ and ‘cost’, there can be the 
incentive to under-report or conceal income “to the extent that this behavior is 
financially rewarded”140 by the payment of lower taxes thereby increasing ‘net 
profit’ and disposable income. However, depending on the “endogeneity of 
honesty”, i.e. “the social, psychological, and moral forces that induce 
individuals to pay their taxes in full”,141 there are societies where “many 
taxpayers are inherently honest, reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive 
to cheat”.142  
Tax compliance vis-à-vis the incentive to cheat are usually affected by the 
level of ability to pay, honesty in the value system of a society, personal moral 
standards, ‘fairness’ in tax rates and the level of effective, efficient and fair tax 
enforcement. Fair tax rates envisage a broad tax-base which results from private 
sector development. It is the expansion of tax base that can ease the tax burden 
per tax payer so that each economic actor can pay taxes with ease and comfort.   
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On the contrary, problems in private sector development adversely affect the 
direct tax base and can create the propensity of governments to raise tax burden 
on the private sector (that is already in the midst of challenges of survival). This 
renders tax compliance difficult, and also suppresses the viability of the private 
sector. The other option of heavy reliance on indirect taxes such as Value Added 
Tax (VAT), would steadily suppress consumer welfare, and encourage the 
proliferation of options such as street vending.  
The three principles in a well-designed tax system are (a) effectiveness “in 
raising revenue”, (b) efficiency “in its effects on economic decisions of 
households and businesses”, and (c) fairness and equity “in its impact on 
different groups in society”.143 Raising revenue without adversely affecting 
efficiency and equity becomes possible only if the tax base is strengthened 
through private sector empowerment and enablement. In countries like Ethiopia 
where street vending and selling in small tents on pedestrian lanes (in the name 
of small enterprises) is widespread, tax payers face challenges on three fronts: 
i.e., tax burden, economic elite pressures and the waves of street vending.  Even 
if street vending seems to enable consumers to buy goods at a relatively cheaper 
price, its long-term impact on the private sector and tax revenue adversely 
affects the society at large, and thus consumers in general.  
8. The Significance of Land Tenure Security in Private Sector 
Empowerment and Fair Competition  
8.1 Gaps in the enhancement of fair access and tenure security to means 
of production 
In spite of the privatization of various public-owned enterprises (since 1991) 
and the liberalization pursuits in Ethiopia, the private sector has not yet become 
the major actor in the economy.144  While land constitutes one of the factors of 
production, Ethiopia’s urban145 and rural146 land laws are susceptible to resource 
capture and corruption owing to the various restrictions in land tenure security, 
transferability and scope of land rights (including very weak access to credit 
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through landholding rights as collaterals). This has adversely affected broad-
based value creation by a viable private sector which is conducive to wider job 
opportunities, a competitive economy and fairly wider choices for consumers in 
the market at fair and affordable price.  
Private sector development is not the outcome of mere pledges and 
declarations. It is rather the result of factors that enhance the economic activities 
of the private sector in the production of goods and services.  In the agricultural 
sector, it is directly related with land rights and tenure security of smallholder 
farmers and other investments in agriculture.  This should not, however, be 
mixed up with large-scale land acquisitions for speculative purposes, that 
contradict genuine forms of responsible agricultural investments. With regard to 
smallholder farms, land rights and tenure security determine productivity, 
investments in the fertility of land, sustainable land management (SLM) and 
access to credit. Such settings are conducive to land consolidation and 
agricultural transformation thereby enabling achievers among smallholder 
farmers to reinvest and consolidate their agricultural activities.  
The AU Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy recommends that 
member states should formulate and operationalize “sound land policies as a 
basis for sustainable human development that includes assuring social stability, 
maintaining economic growth and alleviating poverty and protecting natural 
resources from degradation and pollution”.147 The Framework and Guidelines 
indicates the role of land in Africa’s agricultural economy, other sectors of the 
economy and gender relations.148 The enhancement of agricultural productivity 
and food security requires the “ability to secure access to land resources through 
a variety of tenure systems that guarantee returns for short or long term 
investments”.149  It also needs wider transferability through “robust land rights 
transfer systems and markets offering various types of rights (whether primary 
or secondary)” which can “expand opportunities for the acquisition of land 
resources for many agricultural users engaged in large or small scale, formal or 
informal operations”.150 
Such tenure security in land rights not only enhances agricultural 
productivity and food security, but also strengthens the purchasing power of the 
rural population thereby augmenting the dynamism of the overall economy 
including off-farm economic activities in rural Ethiopia. Vibrant economies in 
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the rural sector thus emanate from grassroots empowerment in which land rights 
and tenure security are crucial. And this envisages empowerment in all 
dimensions of rural landholding (land use, enjoyment of the fruits of the land 
holding, and the scope of disposal) and due regard to all elements in the bundle 
of land rights, i.e., assurance, duration and breadth.  
This does not however, justify land concentration in the hands of the few 
through laissez faire liberalization, but rather calls for pragmatic policies that 
can enhance efficiency, equity, social stability, gender justice and environmental 
sustainability.151 In this regard McAuslan states that: 
“the evidence tends to suggest that a totally unregulated market in land 
produces land hoarding and speculation; a loss of land rights by the poor; a 
depletion of natural resources; and the external costs of land development-
pollution, public health problems, degradation of land, transport costs-passed 
on to the public sector to deal with”.152 
Nor does state ownership of land (in its extreme version) bring about 
economic efficiency and environmental sustainability even if –prima facie– it 
seems to bring about equity and distributive justice. As McAuslan duly 
observes, this option is not only the feature of socialist government policies, but 
was also, to a certain extent, “the feature of many colonial land regimes”153 so 
that colonial powers could have free reign over land.  The argument in favour of 
public ownership of land is that “land is too important a resource to the state to 
allow private individuals to own it” and that public ownership of land enables 
the state “to ensure that it can implement its policy”.154 However, the 
disadvantages of large-scale governmental involvement in land relations 
“outweigh the presumed advantages” due to the downsides that “include 
expense, corruption; misallocation of resources; inappropriate solutions to 
problems and agency capture”.155  
The models that can, according to McAuslan, address the downsides of 
unregulated market in land and the other extreme of large-scale government 
involvement can be the regulatory model which can encounter various 
challenges and the facilitative model156 which unlike the regulatory model can 
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be implemented in the formal land regime, customary land holdings and 
unofficial land markets with a view to securing optimal efficiency, equity, social 
harmony and environmental sustainability.  
8.2  Land readjustment as a practical synthesis between inclusion and 
transformation 
As a synthesis between the extremes, landholdings of small-holder farmers can 
be used as capital contributions in consolidated farms or modern agricultural 
investments in which the prime actors are the landholders themselves.  
Facilitative interventions can also enhance the consolidation of smallholder 
farms or access to credit for peri-urban, urban and rural landholders. Access to 
credit based on landholding can enhance assets, productivity and farm 
consolidation. For example, access to credit can enable landholders to build 
shades that can be rented to potential investors (in various economic activities) 
based on master plans and urban plans.   
In peri-urban areas, the state can be the facilitator in the relationship between 
investors and landholders so that the latter can contribute their holdings as 
capital contribution in projects such as housing development (under the scheme 
of land readjustment).  Or, the state can intervene in readjustment procedures (in 
urban and peri-urban areas) whereby urban development can be conducted 
without displacing the original landholders: 
At the very least, the readjustment procedure can be regarded simply as a 
method for changing the division of land. The land is serviced and part of the 
land (sites) is sold to cover the cost of the project, and the rest is divided 
between the original land owners and users according to the original land 
area or value depending on the agreement or the requirements of the 
jurisdiction. Also a land use agreement can be reached with the public bodies 
and the development of social housing or other socially beneficial outcomes 
may be connected to the procedure.157 
Achamyeleh suggests that “land readjustment is potentially an appropriate 
land development tool to alleviate peri-urban land development limitations in 
Ethiopia”158 and he notes: “introducing land readjustment as a peri-urban 
development tool builds up a participatory and voluntary partnership between 
the municipality and local peri-urban landholders”.159 In the absence of such 
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empowerment of landholders, there would be many phony ‘investors’ (foreign, 
multinational or domestic) who submit very attractive projects and business 
plans, but on the contrary aim at land possessions in the name of allotments for 
investment. Such ‘investors’ aim at the land to be allotted to their ‘investment’ 
and tend to ultimately divert their activities (in the guise of successive losses 
due to power outage, foreign currency shortages for raw materials, etc) after 
having possessed the land in the name of value-creating investments such as 
manufacturing, large-scale farming, and other business activities.   
Good practices in competitive manufacturing envisage that investors usually 
hold shades and premises as tenants (or capital contribution agreements with 
landholders) in the context of competitive and stable house rental markets.  
These investors then focus on the installation of their machineries, start up of 
operations, production processes and marketing (rather than spending most of 
their efforts and capital in the construction of premises).  
8.3  The relationship between unsound land laws and corruption  
Sources of unearned economic rent should be abolished (or at least minimized) 
for the private sector to be viable, vibrant and strong.  As Tollison observes, 
“[n]ormally, the concept of rent seeking is applied to cases where governmental 
intervention in the economy leads to the creation of artificial and contrived 
rents”.160  According to Tollison, “[s]eekng such returns leads to social costs 
because output is fixed by definition in, for example, a government regulatory 
regime”.161 He notes that entrepreneurship under such circumstances inevitably 
becomes negative, and the rent gathered is dissipated thereby leading “to no 
increase in output or the allocation of resources to higher valued uses”.162  
In the context of natural resources, economic rent gathering refers to an 
entitlement to (or the denial of) a resource or access or economic benefit that is 
scarce. This is accompanied by the discretion of officeholders in the decision 
process. In Nigeria, it is usually related to oilfield concessions, in certain 
African states its sources emerge largely from minerals, and in Ethiopia its 
major source is rural and urban land.   
Even if land is scarce in most countries, it cannot be susceptible to unearned 
economic rent gathering unless offices are entitled to allocate or withdraw land 
rights with discretionary powers. Other rent gathering opportunities can include 
discretions of officeholders to allow or deny scarce opportunities such as foreign 
exchange (if there is shortage and restriction), duty-free import facilities, and 
other scarce goods or services. The extent to which land in Ethiopia can be 
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relieved from discretionary powers and opportunities (that prompt rent-
gathering) thus determines the pace of private sector development which is a 
sine qua non factor for fair competition among economic actors in access to 
resources and the production of goods and services.  
Concluding Remarks 
Ethiopia’s Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No. 
813/2013 has embodied provisions (highlighted in Sections 2 and 3) that aim at 
ensuring trade competition. However, there are gaps in enforcement. The 
comparative experience briefly indicated in Sections 4 and 5 indicates positive 
vis-à-vis predatory aspects of state intervention. Although crude protectionism 
(as it was practised under neo-mercantilism) seems to be difficult at present, 
developmental state interventions were successful in Eastern Asia during the 
1960s and early 1970s. In contrast to these positive interventions, predatory 
states impede the development of a broad-based private sector because the ‘low-
level equilibrium trap’ in the role of private economic actors and absence of 
strong civil societies constitute the foundation for discretionary powers, 
suppression and rent gathering.   
The various challenges discussed in this article have created gaps between 
the pledges that are embodied in the law and the deliverables thereof. The 
challenges stated in Sections 5 to 8, show that monopolistic and oligopolistic 
pressures and gaps in land rights and tenure security adversely affect fair trade 
practices and the contribution of land as one of the core factors in production 
and private sector empowerment.  The sections show the need for a broad-based 
and strong private sector that can be an engine of the economy (in accordance 
with the pledges that are articulated in Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation 
Plans). This requires rectifying monopolistic and oligopolistic pressures, 
nurturing rule of law, and reforming Ethiopia’s land laws.   
As indicated in various studies, Ethiopia’s land law involves restrictions in 
land tenure security, transferability, access to credit, etc. –and it lacks a coherent 
and sound land policy other than the general principles of public ownership of 
land embodied in the FDRE Constitution. As McAuslan notes, land “is the 
foundation of shelter, food, work and a sense of nationhood” and  “land policy 
cannot be allowed to go by default;” because “a national land policy is at least 
as important as a national foreign or defence policy”.163  
The 1975 land reform was not preceded by a national land policy, but was 
informed by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. It was the same generation that 
adopted the principle of public ownership of land in the 1995 Constitution 
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without, however, giving due attention to a comprehensive and holistic land 
policy that should have defined the elements and core aspects of public 
ownership of land, a principle that prevails in various jurisdictions under 
different interpretations. Reflexive law-making thus seems to have influenced 
the various land laws that have steadily eroded the land rights and tenure 
security of landholders thereby stunting the private sector’s access to core factors 
of production such as land and access to credit. 
Ethiopia’s land regime is not only economically and environmentally 
inefficient, but it is also the primary source of corruption as highlighted in 
Section 8.3.  According to a World Bank’s study,164 corruption in the land sector 
is increasing due to “a weak policy and regulatory framework surrounding land 
allocation, titling, and management”. The study notes the “opportunities for 
asset capture by elite and senior officials as well as corruption in the 
implementation of existing land policy and laws”. The report states that the acts 
of the corrupt practices include “informal fees, officials’ allocation of land to 
themselves or developers, and issuance of forged land documents”.165 Likewise, 
the 2016 Executive Opinion Survey conducted by the World Economic Forum 
shows that corruption (followed by problems in access to financing) ranks first 
among the most problematic factors in doing business in Ethiopia. 166 
Prospects of rectifyig gaps in this regard have objective timelines, because 
grand and petty corruption are difficult to reverse if they become ‘systemic’, i.e., 
a way of life. The longer Ethiopia procrastinates against empowering and 
enabling the private sector, the magnitude of erosion in Ethiopia’s value system 
can put pursuits of shortcut profiteering and speculation into the mainstream, 
thereby rendering moral standards of honest business practice the exception 
rather than the norm. At such a stage of moral decadence, ‘trade competition’ 
would merely become competition in bribery, counterfeits, manipulation and 
fraud rather than quality, fair price and standards.                                               ■      
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